Navigating Haiti’s Crisis
How an OAS-Led Partnership with PMCs Could Stabilize Governance and Security
I'm an anthropologist who works on social, governance and development problems around the world. Using my experiences I write about how human relationships build (or destroy) social systems and the institutions of governance.
Yes, the situation in Haiti is complicated. It gets more complicated every day, but the solutions become clearer.
1. The USA is calling for an Expanded Role for the OAS in Haiti.
The crossover between crime and governance increasingly defines the political landscape in much of the world, especially Latin America. Though U.S. investment in governance and human rights in the region is being largely eliminated, the threats to U.S. and regional security are increasingly evident and continue to grow. High on the list of concerns are countries with interlocked crime and governance crises, namely Venezuela and Haiti. Despite their differences, certain similarities can be found in the two countries. Venezuela sheds refugees to neighboring countries and the U.S. and is an immediate security threat to its neighbor Guyana, while Haiti sheds refugees to its neighbors and the U.S. and its gangs are an immediate security threat to its neighbors, in particular to Jamaica and the Dominican Republic.
2. Ineffective solutions
The Caribbean’s regional institutions that are focusing on Haiti are slow to evolve from their traditional culture of being ponderous international diplomatic clubs focusing primarily on trade, labor and finance into the more complex and immediately urgent issues that increasingly include rule of law, security and governance. In addition, Latin America’s colonial linguistic legacies, i.e. Spanish, English, French and Portuguese and the political traditions that accompanied those linguistic legacies, have slowed diplomatic protocols and agreements between their member countries. Within the Caribbean, a good example is the halting collaboration between Jamaica - an English-speaking country where the national police are part of the Ministry of Defense, and Haiti, - a French-speaking country where the national police are part of the Ministry of Justice. The political and institutional protocols could not be more different.
Also, Haiti is currently governed by a rather ineffective Transitional Presidential Commission (TPC) that was cobbled together by the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) acting under self-imposed pressure to create a transitional governance structure for the country. The TPC comprises a group of Haitian political parties that have no experience working together and were not elected by citizens to sit on the TPC. Generally personalist rather than ideological in their origins, the parties are bitterly divided by deep-seated historical animosities. There is no transparent working mechanism to vet their representatives on the TPC and accusations between the members have often been heated.
3. It's time to address the Weak Kenya-led Multinational Security Support Mission Arrangement.
After a United Nations endorsement, a Multinational Security Support Mission (MSS) led by Kenya arrived in Haiti slightly over a year ago to support the Haiti National Police’s fight against the gangs that for over two years have been in control of most of Haiti’s capital. Since the arrival of the Kenyans, the other countries that have pledged to contribute personnel to the MSS have been (largely) absent. The United Nations has (yet again) decried the violence, called (yet again) for peace, reported (yet again) that the situation is dire, and declared (yet again) that the armed gangs have expanded their territorial control from 80% to over 90% of Haiti’s capital region.
For many reasons including limited operational strategy, limited intelligence, limited knowledge of the terrain and local society, and limited resources, the MSS has been as ineffective at addressing the gang-crime problem as the TPC has been at addressing the governance problem and as CARICOM has been at building regional support. As well-meaning as was its facilitation of the TPC, CARICOM is limited by its common governance roots as a group of states with a British colonial experience. Compare that experience with Haiti’s. CARICOM has no experience with three centuries of French slavery and another century of a troubled independence shaped by a century-long international embargo, both of which created a complex social and economic reality. As would be expected, the gang-crime crisis is only one side of the coin: the other side of the coin is a maze of two centuries of interlocked governance crises.
These have had may outcomes. An obvious result is today’s gang-crime situation, which has expanded beyond the capital region into the agricultural region north of the capital and into the central part of the country, while the country has made little progress on governance. During the last half of May the Haitian press reported that the Haiti National Police has disrupted a known gang’s attempt to establish a new outpost in St. Louis du Sud, in the South Department not far from Haiti’s new international airport. Also during the same period, in a show of the government’s weak security posture, a previously unknown armed group, possibly one of the anti-gang vigilante groups, captured Haiti’s Western Department border crossing with the Dominican Republic.
4. The USA is calling for an Expanding Role for the Organization of American States (OAS).
Key voices in the U.S. government, such as Secretary of State Marco Rubio, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Caribbean Affairs and Haiti, Barbara Feinstein, and several other senior Senators have publicly called for the OAS to expand its regional mandate to play a lead role in Haiti’s security. “Why do we have an OAS, if the OAS can’t put together a mission to handle the most critical region in our hemisphere?” asked Rubio. He followed: “We’re grateful to the Kenyans, but this is a regional problem, and it should have a regional solution.”
The OAS has a new Secretary General, the highly competent former Surinamese Minister of Foreign Affairs Albert Ramdin. Though his competitor for the position, Paraguay’s former Minister of Foreign Affairs Ruben Lezcado, is also well qualified and seemed to be ideologically more aligned to the current US Administration (the US pays over 40% of the OAS operational costs), Ramdin was previous Deputy OAS Secretary General, is more of a negotiator, and has often mentioned crime/governance conflicts as a regional governance issue. This may not mean he has effective solutions in mind, but at least the countries with the Governance-Crime crossover crises can be approached with the requisite sophistication.
5. Can the OAS Do It?
Being from the only other CARICOM country besides Haiti that does not have a British colonial experience, Ramdin is likely to understand the importance and nuances of Haiti’s unique governance relationships. On June 25, speaking at the opening of the 55th Regular Session of the OAS General Assembly in Antigua and Barbuda, the first OAS General Assembly over which he presided as Secretary General, Ramdin described Haiti’s prolonged crisis as one that demands “a holistic and comprehensive response” from the international community. Having consulted with a range of partners including the United Nations, CARICOM, members of Haiti’s TPC and others, he laid out the beginnings of a sequenced roadmap for possible OAS action in Haiti with five strategic components:
1. Security: addressing escalating violence and insecurity in both urban and rural areas;
2. Humanitarian Assistance: responding to urgent needs for food, healthcare, and shelter;
3. Political Consensus-Building: encouraging national dialogue and inclusive governance;
4. Electoral Processes: creating conditions for free, fair, and timely elections; and
5. Economic Development: promoting stabilization through investment and job creation.
Having a significant and credible resumé, and especially with a new Secretary General whose nationality shares a governance “outlier” status with Haiti, the OAS may be likely able to organize, legitimize, and coordinate multilateral responses and lead such a road map.
Though not a peacekeeping agency like the UN, the OAS has a demonstrated capacity to organize, legitimize, and coordinate multilateral responses rooted in sovereignty and regional consensus. Its field experience supporting peace and institutional stability has included:
Dominican Republic (1965): The Inter-American Peace Force (IAPF) was deployed during the Dominican Civil War, involving troops from Brazil, the U.S., and others under an OAS mandate.
Honduras–Nicaragua (1980s–90s): The OAS mediated political tensions and supported reconciliation efforts.
Haiti (1990s–2010s): OAS contributed to election monitoring, rule of law programs, and public security reform alongside MINUSTAH.
Peace Fund Missions: The OAS supported conflict mediation between Belize, Guatemala and between El Salvador and Honduras from the 2000s into the 2020s.
The OAS also has experience with police professionalism, police reform and public security, competencies that could support Haiti’s stabilization.
For example:
Department of Public Security (DPS) of the OAS: Offers technical assistance on crime prevention, police training, and community safety.
The Inter-American Network for Police Development and Professionalization (REDPPOL) is a network of the OAS that harmonizes police training and standards across the hemisphere.
The InterAmerican Commission on Human Rights (IACHR) of the OAS trains police in rights-compliant practices and accountability.
Field Programs:
o In the Caribbean’s Northern Triangle, the OAS has supported gang prevention and community policing.
o In Mexico and Colombia, the OAS has advanced justice reform and police curricula.
o In the Caribbean, it has worked with international agencies to support drug interdiction, maritime law enforcement, and border security.
Politically, the OAS has a region-wide geographic mandate. While not a traditional peacekeeping body, the OAS has a history of deploying peace-monitoring missions, police reform programs, and election observation teams, including in Haiti. The OAS has a documented capacity in community policing, gang prevention, and cross-border intelligence sharing, - tools highly relevant to Haiti’s fragile context and that may make the OAS qualified to address the security, governance and humanitarian crises in Haiti and to attract considerably more confidence than the Kenya Police.
6. The OAS would be Necessary But not Sufficient
A strong case can be made that if properly supported the OAS can play a proactive leadership role in responding to Haiti’s worsening security crisis and the gangs’ increasing threats to regional security.
But the OAS does not have a standing military or police capacity. This introduces the idea of a more complex intervention involving the OAS plus a gang-fighting force. To be effective against the gangs, an OAS intervention would need specialized military or police support, certainly more effective than the MSS has been.
An OAS role supported with a police or military capacity may be the most regionally legitimate and diplomatically sustainable option remaining. Putting together such a complex strategy would not be easy, but any delay in doing so would reduce its effectiveness, increase its cost, and compound the humanitarian and political fallout throughout the Caribbean and likely into Central America.
7. Incorporating a Gang-Fighting Strategy into an OAS Agreement
Neither Haiti’s governance nor its crime issues are limited to Haiti’s capital region. In fact, the crisis is rapidly expanding in all directions and affects all sectors. A partnership between the OAS and Private Military Companies may best provide the support needed to address Haiti’s complex interconnected crises of governance and security, which now threaten to fully take over the country. Haiti’s gangs are at a point where they can also destabilize Haiti’s immediate neighbors, exploiting a similar gang/governance nexus has already appeared in nearby countries and distant parts of the region. If the OAS can establish a relationship of transparency with the public and can work with tightly regulated private military contractors (PMCs), such replicable partnerships can balance immediate security needs while strengthening governance and safeguarding sovereignty both in Haiti and in other similarly affected parts of the region.
Given the reticence (or inability) of Haiti’s neighbors to contribute to a multinational force, the involvement of one or more private military contractors, either under direct OAS management or operating independently, may be necessary to fill critical security and logistical gaps.
The use of PMCs in complex multilateral missions introduces substantial legal, political, and reputational complexity, which necessitates a carefully structured mandate and skillful management. It is difficult enough for any government to manage two PMCs, not to mention amending their contracts and command structures to incorporate them into a wider agreement with a governance support entity such as the OAS.
The primary mission of any PMCs must be clearly stated in the context of the governance challenge and would need to be clearly stipulated in an OAS/PMC agreement. Any PMC contract would need to address two needs. One need would be explicitly centered on the elimination of armed gangs, the restoration of security to communities and infrastructure, and the disruption, dismantling, and elimination of gang operations and structures, including the capture or arrest of gang leaders. The second need would center on providing specialized strategic and tactical training for the Haitian National Police (HNP) gang unit, mandated to operate in both urban and rural areas. And both PMCs would necessarily be mandated to work closely with relevant OAS operational units—particularly those focused on anti-corruption and vetting programs.
8. Don’t be Fooled: the Gangs Have a Strategy
The Kenyan-led MSS has a nationally stated goal, but no obvious strategy to achieve it. Observers report that important and strategic roads in and between neighborhoods are left to the gangs to control, and that once gangs are cleared from a neighborhood the police withdraw from it, only to be replaced by the gangs once again. Large gang operations are said to surprise the police, who have limited intelligence gathering or processing, and local social media claim that a number of police officers are employed by gangs.
Armed political entities around the world use violence as a means, or strategy, to achieve certain ends. For the gangs, on the other hand, violence is both goal and strategy. One of the challenges in understanding the strategic value of gang violence is that gangs rarely strive to achieve some end-state where their violence is voluntarily halted. Gang violence is an end in itself, even if it is also a means to acquire geographic control or conduct illicit trade or to cloak political rhetoric that can buy time or resources in a negotiation or reprieve. Violence is part of the signature of a gang. A criminal organization may use violence as part of a strategy, whereas a gang is a type of criminal organization whose very nature is inherently violent. This is part of the ongoing debate in many countries over whether to hold political negotiations with a gang for peace.
It is only a matter of time before drone technology, recently used by Haitian law enforcement actions, is adopted by some of the more resourceful gangs. Besides making the gangs more lethal, drones will make them security threats beyond Haiti. The urgency for a coordinated hemispheric response has never been greater. In Ukraine, FPV (First-Person View) kamikaze drones assembled in rustic locations by individuals with minimal training using commercially available components are in wide use. Capable of carrying grenades and other explosives, such battery-powered drones cost well under $1000.
With the support it is receiving from PMCs, the Haiti National Police has been making inroads in its fight against gangs. Though police are still rarely seen in many capital area streets and surrounding communities, several hundred gang members are said to have been killed. In this context it is short minded to assume that none of the Haiti’s gangs might be interested in launching a small armed kamikaze drone from Haiti’s coast or from a small boat at sea onto a nearby country as part of a ransom demand and to make a statement. In fact, in its June 25 newsletter, Insight Crime reports “the gangs themselves are now attempting to acquire drones. In early June, three members of the Viv Ansanm, a powerful gang coalition made up of several of Haiti’s largest criminal groups, were arrested in the Dominican Republic while allegedly trying to purchase drones to use against Haitian police”.
9. A Master Weaver Required
In Haiti two PMCs is reported to have already engaged two PMCs. The rumor is that the Studebaker group is providing training and support to the Haiti National Police and Constellis, Erik Prince’s security company, is directly engaging the gangs.
If the OAS were to subsequently enter the theater, any PMC contracts would have to be amended and woven into a most likely overarching OAS protocol, possibly presenting political and management difficulties. Would the PMCs work for and under the OAS, or would the PMCs work alongside or independently of the OAS? There are risks and benefits associated with both scenarios.
10. Risks and Benefits of Working with PMCs
Whether the PMCs work for and under the OAS or alongside but independently of it, the management and contractual challenges would certainly exceed the capacity demonstrated thus far by the TPC.
The benefits and risks would include:
Benefits
Rapid Deployment: PMCs offer logistical readiness and can be mobilized faster than state forces or multilateral contingents.
Specialized Skills: Many PMCs have experience in convoy protection, infrastructure security, and high-threat environments.
Force Multiplier: For a body like the OAS, which lacks standing troops, PMCs can provide essential operational support.
Flexible Contracting: PMCs can be scaled based on operational needs without long-term political commitments.
Protection for Civilian Missions: PMCs may guard OAS personnel and assets in insecure zones, enabling political and humanitarian work to proceed.
Risks
Accountability Gaps: PMCs often operate outside established international legal frameworks, making enforcement of norms difficult.
Damage to Legitimacy: Use of for-profit armed actors can undermine the OAS’s credibility, particularly in Haiti, where foreign intervention has a contentious history. A strong Public Information and highly decentralized interactive Civic Dialog program would be required to address this important risk.
Undermined Norms: The presence of PMCs may contradict the OAS’s stated values of democratic governance and rule of law.
Operational Confusion: Overlapping responsibilities and unclear command structures may create risks of miscommunication or conflict escalation.
Public Resistance: Though doubtful at this point in Haiti’s current security situation, Haitian civil society and political elites may perceive PMC involvement as neocolonial or predatory. Here again, a strong Public Information and highly decentralized interactive Civic Dialog program would be required to address this important risk.
11. Managing the Risks
To manage potential pitfalls associated with PMC involvement, it is critical to establish robust accountability frameworks. These should include clear contractual obligations, rigorous vetting processes, transparent reporting systems, and frequent independent audits to assess adherence to human rights standards and operational effectiveness. Additionally, proactive public information campaigns and civic dialogue initiatives must be prioritized to address community concerns, mitigate skepticism, and counter negative perceptions regarding PMC presence in Haiti. These measures would ensure PMC operations align closely with OAS values and local expectations.
Clear mechanisms for ensuring OAS oversight and transparency in PMC operations should be articulated through explicit governance structures and regular performance evaluations. The establishment of a dedicated oversight committee comprising OAS officials, representatives from Haitian civil society, and international accountability experts could ensure impartial monitoring. Comprehensive reporting mandates, including real-time updates accessible to stakeholders, periodic public briefings, and transparent grievance redressal systems, would reinforce public trust. Such mechanisms are essential to demonstrate accountability, legitimacy, and a firm commitment to democratic governance principles throughout the intervention.
12. Long Term Solution
The international community and, admittedly, many Haitians, look forward to national elections as a panacea to Haiti’s governance crises. Since the fall of the Duvalier regime in 1986, however, Haiti has held some 11 national-level elections, including both general (presidential and legislative) elections and standalone presidential contests. It won’t be easy, as there have not been elections in Haiti for over ten years, and the positions to be filled exceed 150.
13. Some Have Spoken of the Idea of a Modern, Enhanced Type of Trusteeship
I have spoken to many Haitian youths who believe that, given the political rancor that characterizes Haiti’s current political landscape, the country’s political leadership has demonstrated it is incapable of overcoming the country’s current partisan limitations, and that resolving Haiti’s governance problems will require a broader intervention,- a sort of modernized trusteeship run by the OAS with Haitian civil society oversight that will oversee not only the integrity of national elections but also a restructuring of Haiti’s historical governance shortcomings.
Through a providential coincidence parts of such a governance re-building process is currently under way in Haiti that can give legitimacy to a modern, enhanced Haitian-led civil society-run trusteeship model overseeing an OAS role.
On July 17, 2024 the TPC issued a decree establishing a National Conference and its Steering Committee to oversee constitutional reform and other critical national processes. Enex Jean-Charles, a former Prime Minister, was put in charge of the Steering Committee, which was charged with drafting and guiding a new constitution. On May 21, 2025 after several months of public consultations held both within Haiti and among the diaspora, the Steering Committee officially handed a preliminary draft of the Constitution to the Transitional Presidential Council and solicited public feedback from May 22 to June 21, 2025 aiming to refine the draft through inclusivity and citizen engagement. If built around such a national dialogue process on the new Constitution the OAS could successfully build a modern, enhanced Haitian-led trusteeship model with civil society oversight that would, for once in Haiti’s history of governance failures, overcome the tragic legacy of Haiti’s colonial experience.
It should be noted that Haiti’s civil society extends beyond its borders to include the country’s large and influential Diaspora. In 2024 alone, Haitians abroad, especially those in the United States, Canada, Europe, and Latin America,- sent an estimated US$3.3 to $4.1 billion in remittances. This figure represented approximately 21–24% of Haiti’s GDP over the previous three years (2021–2024), far surpassing the $1.1 billion total U.S. foreign assistance to Haiti during that period.
In addition to remittances, many members of the Diaspora invest informally in businesses and services in Haiti, though precise figures are unavailable due to limited investment facilitation and tracking mechanisms. Recognizing the Diaspora’s vital economic, civic, and cultural role, the Haitian Constitution refers to it as the '11th Department', a symbolic term that underscores its significance alongside Haiti’s ten geographic departments. The Diaspora represents a potentially transformative component of Haitian civil society, not only as a source of financial support but also as a force for stability, advocacy, innovation, and democratic engagement.
Can Haitian civil society, including its Diaspora, oversee an OAS role supported by security enhancements provided by PMCs?